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TRANSFORMATIVE JUSTICE AND THE
ETHOS OF NUREMBERG
Jonathan Turley*
I. INTRODUCTION
Ideally, every case has an impact beyond its immediate parties
and controversy. Courts will often craft doctrines or holdings to
reach beyond the confines of a given case. Such extrinsic values are
often expressed by courts in terms of deterrence and bright-line rules
referring to the intended impact on future cases or conduct. The role
of dicta is often to speak to such extrinsic issues, to speak to the fu-
ture. Occasionally, a case will have the rare confluence of timing,
facts, and issues to have a pronounced effect on society.' Some
cases are so influential that their names become synonymous with
legal rights, such as Miranda.2 Other cases become the symbols of
the turmoil of the times, such as the Red Scare and the Rosenbergs,)
* J.B. and Maurice C. Shapiro Professor of Public Interest Law at George
Washington University.
1. Many of these trials are discussed in a study by the Author which ex-
plores the role of trials in society as well as the intrinsic and extrinsic elements
that appear to elevate certain trials to national and international significance.
See Jonathan Turley, Trials and Social Discourse: The Social and Legal Role
of Great Trials in the Twentieth Century (manuscript) [hereinafter Trials and
Social Discourse]; see also Jonathan Turley, The Trial Attorney of the Century,
LEGAL TIMES, Nov. 29, 1999, at 50 [hereinafter The Trial Attorney of the
Century] (discussing study as the basis for selecting the four greatest trial at-
torneys of the century, including the status of Clarence Darrow as the greatest
trial attorney); Jonathan Turley, The Trial of the Century, LEGAL TIMES, Sept.
27, 1999, at 27 [hereinafter The Trial of the Century] (discussing study as the
basis for selecting Nuremberg as the century's greatest trial as well as other top
contenders).
2. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (requiring a full and effective
warning of a defendant's constitutional rights).
3. The trial of the Rosenbergs illustrates the confluence of prejudices and
fears that can come into play in a case. The Rosenbergs can also be cited as a
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anti-Semitism and the Frank case,4 or racism and the Scottsboro de-
fendants. 5 They form an American mosaic; a collection of great tri-
als that recorded the progress of a nation grappling with a century of
social, economic, and political change.
More than any other nation on Earth, the United States has been
shaped by trials and their characters.7 These trials educated,
shocked, inspired, angered, and fascinated a nation. Trials can be-
come forums for political or social conflicts left unaddressed in the
political system.8 Each of these trials contributed to the evolution of
a society that began this century as a largely regionalized nation with
little knowledge of the legal system. Some trials forced sudden con-
frontations and debates across the country as with the trials of Leo
Frank9 and the Hollywood Ten.10 More often, changes were gradual
and almost imperceptible. As high-profile trials became part of the
regular diet for news events, citizens became more familiar with the
workings and rituals of the legal system. By the end of the century,
legal phrases would become part of everyday language while televi-
sion would produce an army of ardent court watchers and armchair
litigators.1
case fueled by anti-Semitism in both the public and government. See generally
Trials and Social Discourse, supra note 1 (exploring the legal and social influ-
ence of great trials in the twentieth century).
4. See Trials and Social Discourse, supra note 1.
5. See infra note 12 and accompanying text.
6. See generally Trials and Social Discourse, supra note 1.
7. See id.
8. Race issues are a good example of how the courts become the forum for
the debate over segregation and racism in the absence of a political response.
Where the state and federal legislatures proved reluctant or hostile in dealing
with race issues, the federal judiciary articulated the basis for a change in civil
rights law and doctrine. See generally WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., THE CASE
FOR SAME-SEX MARRIAGE: FROM SEXUAL LIBERTY TO CIVILIZED
COMMITMENT (1996) (discussing the ways in which civil rights issues were
worked out in the courts, rather than through the legislative process).
9. See The Trial of the Century, supra note 1; see also The Trial Attorney
of the Century, supra note 1; Trials and Social Discourse, supra note 1.
10. See The Trial of the Century, supra note 1; see also The Trial Attorney
of the Century, supra note 1; Trials and Social Discourse, supra note 1.
11. There has always been a strong interest among free people in the adju-
dication of legal disputes. This interest, however, was given a powerful tech-
nological catalyst in this century. With the advent of television, the concept of
a "public trial" became far more personal and immediate for Americans.
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In a century transformed in part by great trials, the task of identi-
fying the "trial of the century" is daunting. This task is certainly
made easier by the operative noun of this Symposium: "trial." Had
this Symposium asked for the "case of the century," the task of se-
lection would be virtually impossible to accomplish on any objective
basis. Identifying the trial of the century focuses the analysis on ac-
tual trials and their inherent significance as opposed to their prece-
dent or ultimate outcome on appeal. It is a meaningful distinction
because trials often have a greater impact on average citizens than
the arcane lessons of cases. It is the trial that can crystallize a con-
cept or a right in the minds of the public with parties personifying
particular symbols or values. In this way, the struggles that take
place in the courtroom serve to transform abstractions into concrete
terms and faces.'
2
The greatest trials can capture or even transform the views or
prejudices of a period. Sometimes this is simply due to timing. A
particular issue may be litigated repeatedly in various unknown ven-
ues and suddenly capture the attention of a nation or even the
world.' 3 Sometimes this is due to the litigants or the lawyers who
bring an element of fame or infamy to a case. 14  Most often,
Where a trial like the Thaw murder was followed closely through print media,
television would allow an almost addictive real-time option for citizens. At
first blush, this technological advantage would appear to elevate more modem
cases over the earliest trials. In reality, however, it appears that the saturation
of the media with trials has actually made it more difficult for trials to become
distinguished to the extent of prior "great" trials. See Trials and Social Dis-
course, supra note 1. While the educational benefits of televised trials are of-
ten understated, television also tended to blur the line between entertainment
and adjudication. Starting with the Lindbergh case, the public could switch
from television dramas to actual trial dramas with increasing ease so that, by
the time of the Simpson case, real trials appeared produced for public con-
sumption.
12. See The Trial of the Century, supra note 1.
13. Such was the case with the Scottsboro defendants. See id. The trial of
African-Americans in an atmosphere of racism based on questionable evidence
was nothing new for the African-American community. Scottsboro, however,
contained the right elements to raise the case to the national level and ulti-
mately drew such renowned lawyers as Samuel S. Leibowitz to the defense.
See id.
14. Such was certainly the case with lawyers like Clarence Darrow who
brought international attention to many trials, particularly the Scopes trial. See
The Trial Attorney of the Century, supra note 1.
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however, it is due to the evolution of a society. Yet, this does not
mean that society is always ready to change. The process of con-
fronting prejudice or ignorance is often difficult and even violent.15
Legal change often comes in a fracturing of the status quo; a convul-
sive response to a long-standing social or legal norm. In fact, a great
trial may technically be a defeat, such as in the case of the Scopes
trial,' 6 but in reality triumph by planting a seed in the minds of mil-
lions. Where a concept like creationism was viewed as inviolate, a
trial can suggest that there is an alternative view-an alternative re-
ality.
Over the course of this century, an impressive number of cases
have been given the title of "great" trials or "trial of the century."'
17
Despite such strong contenders as the Scopes trial and Leopold and
Loeb, this Article will suggest that the trials at Nuremberg can lay
the best claim to this title.'1 Nuremberg can be easily viewed as an
American proceeding due to its heavy reliance on American prose-
cutors and trial process rules. 19 It is a trial that possessed all of the
15. Many of the trials discussed in the article were attended by violent out-
bursts from the public, including the lynching of Leo Frank. See Trials and
Social Discourse, supra note 1. To their considerable credit, attorneys like
Clarence Darrow and Samuel Leibowitz often required physical protection
from attack yet continued to press their cases with zealous commitment to their
clients. See The Trial Attorney of the Century, supra note 1.
16. See The Trial of the Century, supra note 1.
17. See generally Trials and Social Discourse, supra note 1.
18. Nuremberg was obviously composed of various trials. After the first
Nuremberg trial, the Allied Control Council decided to allow each nation to try
war criminals in their own sector under Law No. 10. See Richard May & Ma-
rieke Wierda, Trends in International Criminal Evidence: Nuremberg, Tokyo,
The Hague, and Arusha, 37 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 725, 731 (1999).
American judges sat in judgment of 177 defendants in twelve trials in two and
a half years. See id. However, Nuremberg is often referred to in the singular
due to its symbolic role in the trial of war criminals. This Article will also re-
fer to Nuremberg in this way.
19. In fact, twelve of the trials were entirely American proceedings con-
ducted in the American Sector of Germany. See id. Professor Bush has noted
that this American accent also had a certain East Coast, classist twang: "Many
of the framers of Nuremberg and its American participants were from a largely
closed elite of East Coast lawyers.... [At a time when] WASP lawyers and
bankers served the public weal and the Pax Americana before returning to
Wall Street, and where a bright able lawyer might, over the course of a career,
work on matters involving almost all the leaders of the national legal and pol-
icy communities." Jonathan A. Bush, Nuremberg: The Modern Law of War
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elements of a great trial from the quality of its argument to its sig-
nificance in the development of international law and values. In or-
der to achieve justice at Nuremberg, however, the world had to break
context and transcend the pain and trauma of the war.20  Accom-
plishing this feat at Nuremberg represents one of the great achieve-
ments of modern law. Though composed of many trials, Nuremberg
became synonymous with the very notion of international justice.
Nuremberg prosecutor Telford Taylor once observed that "'Nurem-
berg' is both what actually happened there and what people think
happened, and the second is more important than the first.... [I]t is
not the bare record but the ethos of Nuremberg with which we must
reckon today.",
21
Regrettably, Nuremberg remains a trial from our time. From
Rwanda to Bosnia to Kosovo, war criminals continue to plague a
world already burdened by a long history of atrocities. If Nuremberg
is not an absolute deterrent for world criminals, however, it remains
an assurance for world citizens of the transcendence of law. It is not
a symbol of the potential of war criminals but a symbol of our own
potential for justice. Ultimately, it was justice on trial in Nuremberg
and justice that prevailed in the trial of the century.
and its Limitations, 93 COLuM. L. REv. 2022, 2056 (1993) (reviewing
TELFORD TAYLOR, THE ANATOMY OF THE NUREMBERG TRIALS: A PERSONAL
MEMOIR (1992)).
20. This requirement was made plain in the trial of Eichmann before an Is-
raeli court. Attorney General of Israel v. Eichmann, 36 I.L.R. 5, 8-9 (1961).
Ben-Gurion, however, took a broader view of the trial as part of a historical
continuum of persecution of Jews. See David Ben-Gurion, The Eichmann
Case as Seen by Ben-Gurion, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 18, 1960, at 7. By bringing
Eichmann "to the Jewish state to face Jewish justice," Ben-Gurion hoped "[to]
create a sense of empowerment and healing." Pinina Lahav, The Eichmann
Trial, The Jewish Question, and the American-Jewish Intelligentsia, 72 B.U. L.
REV. 555, 559 (1992); see Matthew Lippman, Law, Lawyers, and Legality in
the Third Reich: The Perversion of Principle and Professionalism, 11 TEMP.
INT'L & COMp. L.J. 199, 307 (1997); see also HANNAH ARENDT, EICHMANN
IN JERUSALEM: A REPORT ON THE BANALITY OF EVIL 276 (1963) (describing
the judges task upon being confronted by Eichmann).
21. TELFORD TAYLOR, NUREMBERG AND VIETNAM: AN AMERICAN
TRAGEDY 13-14 (1970) [hereinafter NUREMBERG AND VIETNAM]; see also
Richard Falk, Telford Taylor and the Legacy of Nuremberg, 37 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 693 (1999) (suggesting that the main legacy of Nuremberg can
be seen in the application of laws of war to both the vanquished and the victo-
rious).
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II. NUREMBERG As THE TRIAL OF THE CENTURY
The new millennium has increased interest in reviewing the tri-
als and litigators of the century. 2 At first blush, the task of isolating
the trial of the century appears too subjective and too arbitrary for
any meaningful academic judgment. Even a cursory list of famous
trials yields dozens of possible claimants.23 Each of these choices
has a claim to the title of the trial of the century based on notoriety or
significance. This initial list can be winnowed down through a series
of negative criteria, particularly to eliminate trials known primarily
for their sensational facts without creating any lasting legal legacy.
2 4
These eliminations leave seven cases for consideration: the trial of
Leopold and Loeb, 25 the Scopes trial,26 the Lindbergh trial,27 the
Nuremberg trial,28 the Calley trial,29 the O.J. Simpson trial,30 and the
22. See The Trial of the Century, supra note 1; The Trial Attorney of the
Century, supra note 1.
23. See Trials and Social Discourse, supra note 1.
24. See id.; The Trial of the Century, supra note 1, at 27.
25. The 1924 trial of Nathan Leopold and Richard Loeb for the "thrill-
killing" of fourteen-year-old Bobby Franks shocked a nation. Motivated by
self-delusions to commit their crimes, as if they were Nietzchean Supermen,
the two defendants raised issues of insanity and the death penalty to a national
level under the counsel of Clarence Darrow. See Trials and Social Discourse,
supra note 1.
26. The 1925 trial of John Thomas Scopes for teaching the principles of
evolution placed two of the greatest advocates, Clarence Darrow and William
Jennings Bryan, into a courtroom drama that attracted international attention.
The trial itself had tremendous impact at the time as the public debated the
quintessential issue of science and religion as well as entanglement issues. See
id.
27. The 1935 trial of Bruno Hauptmann for the kidnapping and murder of
Charles Lindbergh, Jr. was an international sensation. While the trial was in-
undated with abusive tactics and unfair rulings, it was the first criminal pro-
ceeding witnessed nationally through film. See id.
28. See The Trial of the Century, supra note 1.
29. The 1970 court-martial of Lieutenant William Calley for his role in the
My Lai massacre placed the Vietnam War and questions of personal responsi-
bility for war crimes into sharp relief. The trial became a critical forum for de-
fining the rules of engagement for field combat officers and personnel. See
Trials and Social Discourse, supra note 1.
30. The 1996 trial of movie actor and sports hero O.J. Simpson set new re-
cords for television viewership. Accused of the gruesome murder of his ex-
wife and her friend, Simpson's trial saw a skillful defense pitted against com-
pelling DNA evidence. This trial could have been truly historic in terms of
660
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Clinton impeachment.3 1 Ultimately, three positive criteria can be
applied to isolate the greatest trials from among the great trials of this
century: (1) the quality of trial advocacy; (2) the significance of the
trial itself through the introduction of new trial techniques and argu-
ments; and (3) the transformative value of the trial. The Scopes trial
and the Leopold and Loeb trial come closest in all three categories to
the title of trial of the century.32 One case, however, stands out as
both legally and historically unique-Nuremberg.
The position of Nuremberg at the top of each of the three cate-
gories used to select the trial of the century was far from preor-
dained. After World War II the Allies could have easily held a per-
functory version of a "drum-head" trial and simply executed German
officials. This is precisely what Stalin wanted and neither Churchill
nor Roosevelt objected vociferously to the notion.33  While Stalin
wanted 50,000 Germans summarily executed,34 Churchill simply
trial advocacy but for the poor performance and tactics of the prosecution. See
id.
31. The Clinton impeachment and Senate trial became a national debate
over the meaning and purpose of impeachment in the Constitution. See, e.g.,
Jonathan Turley, Congress As Grand Jury: The Role of the House of Repre-
sentatives in the Impeachment of an American President, 67 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 735 (1999); Jonathan Turley, The Executive Function Theory, The Ham-
ilton Affair, and Other Constitutional Mythologies, 77 N.C. L. REv. 1791
(1999); Jonathan Turley, Senate Trials and Factional Disputes: Impeachment
As a Madison Device, 49 DUKE L.J. 1 (1999). Millions of citizens watched or
participated in a debate over the basis for the removal of a president The
House and Senate proceedings saw extremely high levels of advocacy on both
sides. See id.
32. See The Trial of the Century, supra note 1.
33. See Michael P. Scharf, Have We Really Learned the Lessons of Nurem-
berg?, 149 MIL. L. REv. 65, 65 n.2 (1995) (stating that Churchill favored exe-
cutions for the most prominent German war criminals, and that Roosevelt was
noncommital on the issue of executions).
34. Stalin continued to press this demand, as with this notable toast at the
Tehran Conference:
[F]ollowing a banquet attended by Roosevelt and Churchill, the Soviet
dictator proposed a toast, stating, "I drink to the quickest possible jus-
tice for all German war criminals. I drink to the justice of a firing
squad." When Churchill objected, Stalin again raised his glass and
proclaimed, "Fifty thousand must be shot."
Kevin R. Chaney, Pitfalls and Imperatives: Applying the Lessons of Nurem-
berg to the Yugoslav War Crimes Trials, 14 DICK. J. INT'L L. 57, 62 n.22
(1995) (citing JOE J. HEYDECKER & JOHANNEs LEEB, THE NuREMBERG TRIAL
January 2000]
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differed on the number of executions, not on the manner of their ad-
judication.35 History is replete with such examples of "victor's jus-
tice."'36 With the pictures of the concentration camps flooding into
the world's view and millions of deaths due to Nazi aggression, it
would certainly have been understandable if the world community
surrendered to an impulse for immediate retribution through execu-
tions or a simple "Show Trial.
' 37
Thus, the most extraordinary aspect of Nuremberg was that a
world savaged by the unspeakable crimes of the Nazi regime was
able to check such impulses in what may be the ultimate triumph of
principle over passion. Associate Justice Robert H. Jackson, chief
prosecutor at Nuremberg, put it best when he observed, "[t]hat four
great nations, flushed with victory and stung with injury stay the
hand of vengeance and voluntarily submit their captive enemies to
the judgment of the law is one of the most significant tributes that
Power has ever paid to Reason. '38  Rather than resemble the war
77-78 (R.A. Downie trans., 1962)).
35. See Scharf, supra note 33, at 65 n.2 (noting that Churchill did not op-
pose execution but only the size of Stalin's demand to execute 50,000 German
General Staff Officers); see also Benjamin B. Ferencz, International Criminal
Courts: The Legacy of Nuremberg, 10 PACE INT'L L. REV. 203, 210 (1998)
(quoting former Nuremberg prosecutor who noted that "[r]ather than try [Axis]
leaders in a long judicial proceeding, the British... felt that 'execution with-
out trial is the preferable course"').
36. See generally Timothy L. H. McCormack, Selective Reaction to Atroc-
ity: War Crimes and the Development of International Criminal Law, 60 ALB.
L. REV. 681, 717 (1997) (discussing the historical development of international
criminal justice).
37. After the commencement of the trial, it became clear to the defendants
for the first time that they could expect both the full process and penalties of a
war crimes trial.
With the presentation of the case and the opening of proceedings the
hopes even of those who had thought that the IMT would be a farce
and that the trial would be quickly over were gone. G6ring, for in-
stance, had initially maintained that the worst would not happen to any
of them, but he now reckoned that he would probably be hanged,
though he secretly harboured the hope that the Allies would be unable
to agree among themselves.
WERNER MASER, NUREMBERG: A NATION ON TRIAL 91 (Richard Berry trans.,
1979) (1977).
38. Prosecutor Justice Robert H. Jackson's Address to International Mili-
tary Tribunal (Nov. 21, 1945), in 2 TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS
BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARYTRIBUNAL 98, 99 (1947).
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criminals that they sought to punish, the world insisted on reinforc-
ing the core values that the Germans denied in their own courts and
government.3 9 As Jackson stated to the Court:
We must never forget that the record on which we judge
these defendants today is the record on which history will
judge us tomorrow. To pass these defendants a poisoned
chalice is to put it to our lips as well. We must summon
such detachment and intellectual integrity to our task that
this Trial will commend itself to 4posterity as fulfilling hu-
manity's aspirations to do justice.
It was the absence of legal process that facilitated the ultimate muta-
tion of German society. It would now be legal process that would
excise that mutation.
Nuremberg's lasting impact on both the conduct of nations and
the consciousness of individual citizens distinguishes this trial from
any other criminal adjudication. 41 This was due in part to the prose-
cution of high-level officials who authorized war crimes. The most
well-known Nuremberg trial involved the highest ranking German
figure captured after the war, Hermann G6ring.42 G6ring was tech-
nically the second-highest ranking official in the Nazi regime, though
this position was questionable towards the end of the war given
39. The conflict in values was never more obvious than the trial of Nazi
judges who carried out atrocities under the guise of legal process. See
Lippman, supra note 20, at 199. These judges were tried for such acts as car-
rying out the 1941 "Nacht und Nebel (Night and Fog) Decree" under which
thousands were killed or imprisoned. See AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL USA,
DISAPPEARANCES: A WORKBOOK 2 (1981) [hereinafter AMNESTY INT'L USA].
Hitler personally oversaw the creation of this law and, in a letter to Nuremberg
Defendant Keitel stressed that "[e]ffective intimidation ...can only be
achieved either by capital punishment or by measures by which the relatives of
the criminal and the population do not know his fate." Id. Ultimately, the
judges were convicted for their widespread use of the death penalty, a position
that once again raised questions of hypocrisy for both Russia and the United
States. See 2 TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE
INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL, supra note 38, at 275-76.
40. 2 TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL
MILITARY TRIBUNAL, supra note 38, at 101.
41. Following World War I, efforts to apply international law to war crimes
had been discussed but never fully implemented. See Ferencz, supra note 35,
at 206-08.
42. See infra note 43.
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Hitler's final orders changing his successor.43 Nevertheless, G6ring
was the most famous Nazi leader living at the end of the war, and his
co-defendants were some of the most recognizable faces of the Nazi
regime. They represented the broad spectrum of Nazi leaders, bu-
reaucrats, and field commanders that maintained the German war ef-
fort and committed war crimes.44 While later trials would focus on
43. As a Field Marshall, G6ring was the head of the Luftwaffe. He would
later become Chairman of the Reich Counsel for National Defense. Hitler had
designated Gdring as his successor, a decision later reversed in the final days
of the regime. G6ring had fallen out of favor in the final days of the regime
when he pressed the question of his succession on Hitler. Believing that Hitler
no longer possessed the freedom of action to lead the country, G6ring tele-
graphed Hilter for approval to assume control as his successor. If Hitler did
not respond, G6ring would conclude that "the Ffihrer has been deprived of his
freedom of action to conduct the affairs of the Reich... [and] I am heir to all
his offices as his deputy." MASER, supra note 37, at 44. Hitler responded by
ordering G6ring's immediate arrest and expulsion from the Nazi party. Hitler
ultimately handed over command of the German forces to Admiral Doenitz.
See id. at 153.
44. In addition to G6ring, the defendants included: Martin Bormann (tried
in absentia), head of the Party Chancellery; Karl Doenitz, Commander in Chief
of the German Navy; Hans Frank, Reich Minister of Justice and later Gover-
nor-General of Poland; Wilhelm Frick, one of the original members of the
"Beer Hall Putsch" who later served as Minister of the Interior as well as Pro-
tector of Bohemia and Moravia; Hans Fritzsche, head of the German radio
News Service and a high official in the Ministry of Propaganda; Rudolf Hess,
Reich Vice-Chancellor until his capture in England while attempting a secret
meeting with the British Leadership; Alfred Jodl, Major-General and Chief of
the Operations Staff of the Wehrmacht; Ernst Kaltenbrunner, former Austrian
Minister for State Security and RSHA head with control of the Gestapo and the
SS; Wilheim Keitel, Field Marshall and Chief of Staff of the High Command;
Constantin von Neurath, Hitler's first Foreign Minister who later served as
Protector of Bohemia and Moravia; Franz von Papen, former Chancellor of
Germany who later held ambassadorial positions during the Nazi regime; Erich
Raeder, Grand-Admiral and Commander in Chief of the Navy; Joachim von
Ribbentrop, Hitler's Foreign Minister; Alfred Rosenberg, head of the Nazi
party Foreign Affairs Department and Minister of the Occupied Eastern Terri-
tories; Fritz Sauckel, Thuringian Minister of the Interior and head of labor mo-
bilization; Hjalmar Schacht, President of the Reichsbank as well as Minister of
Economics and Head of the War Economy; Baldur von Schirach, Nazi Youth
Leader and later Governor of Vienna; Arthur Seyss-Inquart, Austrian Minister
of the Interior, Austrian Chancellor and after annexation, Reich Commissioner
of Austria; Albert Speer, Nazi Armaments Minister; and Julius Streicher,
leading anti-Semitic publisher and propagandist. See id. at 78. A final defen-
dant Robert Ley who oversaw the use of slave labor and extermination efforts,
hung himself in his cell in October 1945. See id. at 71-72.
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judicial figures or other functional categories, the first Nuremberg
proceeding placed the entire regime on trial with the ranking repre-
sentatives of its various military and civilian components. 45 No law-
yers in history have faced a trial with so many unknown elements.
The only certainty in Nuremberg 46 was that history would be made.
A. Quality of TrialAdvocacy
In terms of trial advocacy and practice, the Nuremberg trials saw
highly capable prosecutors, such as Robert Jackson,47 and defense
counsel, such as Otto Kranzbuehler, 48 struggle with this unprece-
dented legal forum. For the prosecution, the greatest challenge was
to build a case primarily from documentary evidence, resulting in the
45. A few of the defendants were anomalies, particularly people like Hans
Fritzsche, who was added to the case under tremendous pressure from the Rus-
sians. See Bush, supra note 19, at 2047 (noting that "Hans Fritzsche was
named because his boss, Joseph Goebbels, was dead, even though Fritzsche
was a relatively unimportant Nazi propagandist [and] prosecutors.. . deemed
it important that at least some of the defendants be persons whom the French
and Russians had apprehended, and Fritzsche was one of only two defendants
captured by the Soviets").
46. It has been suggested that the verdict in the first trial was all but certain.
This is often cited as proof that it was a show trial despite the fact that the evi-
dence of atrocities was easily sufficient to support the death sentences. In fact,
the Nazis themselves believed that the incredible nature of their atrocities
would make it all but impossible to prove through eyewitness testimony. See
Lawrence Douglas, Film as Witness: Screening Nazi Concentration Camps
Before the Nuremberg Tribunal, 105 YALE L.J. 449, 451 (1995). Several of
the defendants at Nuremberg were therefore shattered when they were shown a
film of the death camps they helped create and maintain. See id. at 455-56.
Until the showing of the film, Gdring was actually given to joking and teasing
in court but later complained that "they [then] showed that awful film, and it
just spoiled everything." TELFORD TAYLOR, THE ANATOMY OF THE
NUREMBERG TRIALS 187 (1992).
47. See Bush, supra note 19, at 2052 (stating that "[m]ore than any other
single person, Nuremberg is the glory of Robert Jackson").
48. Kranzbuehier, a Judge Naval Advocate, was the highly respected coun-
sel for Admiral Doenitz. See TAYLOR, supra note 46, at 266; see also MASER,
supra note 37, at 153. The defendants themselves selected attorneys from a
long list of options. The list included a number of the most respected German
lawyers and leaders of the German Bar. See Henry T. King, Jr., The Nurem-
berg Context from the Eyes of a Participant, 149 MIL. L. REv. 37, 44 (1995).
One of these lawyers, Friedrich Bergold, was famous for his defense of Jeho-
vah's Witnesses during the Nazi regime. See id.; see also MASER, supra note
37, at 73 (stating that Bergold represented Borman in absentia).
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most extensive use of such evidence in history. The prosecution had
to navigate the countless issues that arose in the establishment of
rules and procedures of this new world forum. 49
Procedurally and logistically, the Nuremberg trial... pre-
sented unparalleled difficulties.... Trial proceedings had to
be conducted simultaneously in four languages ...and
Jackson ultimately located a simultaneous translation sys-
tem that the young, innovative IBM had produced.... Pro-
curing witnesses from all over Europe and sifting through
the mountain of captured German documents-a full
twelve-year record of a modern state in action-were chal-
lenges of Herculean proportion. Most of all, there was the
complexity of the facts themselves. Indeed, in an age when
routine American trials, criminal or civil, often take months
or years, we can look back with admiration on a prosecution
team that was able to present in four months the case-in-
chief against the German state, its principals and organiza-
tions, for acts occurring over the course of a decade all
across Europe."
This effort required over 15,000 pages of trial material, over 200
witnesses, and over 300,000 affidavits.5' The trial also included the
novel and effective use of film footage as evidence.52 This "filmic
witness ' ' 53 was virtually unprecedented before Nuremberg. 4
For the defense counsel, the challenge was not logistics as much
as the preclusion of certain affirmative defenses. Defense lawyers
were also at a disadvantage in both unfair restrictions as well as a
lack of experience in arts such as cross-examination." The most
49. See Bush, supra note 19, at 2035.
50. Id.
51. See id. at2035 n.39.
52. For a splendid treatment of this subject, see Douglas, supra note 46.
53. See Douglas, supra note 46, at 452. This "witness" was viewed as vital
in allowing the Tribunal to imagine the unimaginable. See id. at 453 (noting
that "[t]he Nuremberg prosecution's turn to the filmic witness can.., be un-
derstood as an attempt to secure an adequate representation of 'an order of re-
ality which the human mind had never confronted before"').
54. See id. at 451 (noting that "[t]hough motion pictures had been submitted
as trial evidence as early as 1915, prior to Nuremberg, one can find no records
of any court using graphic film of atrocities as proof of criminal wrongdoing").
55. See Norman Silber & Geoffrey Miller, Toward "Neutral Principles" in
the Law: Selections from the Oral History of Herbert Wechsler, 93 COLUM. L.
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interesting element was the use of the tu quoque principle by the de-
fendants to show that charged crimes often were indistinguishable
from the conduct of the victorious powers.5 6 Defense lawyers re-
peatedly raised such analogous acts as the American fire bombing of
cities like Dresden, the failure of American submarines to pick up
survivors in the Pacific, and the great variety of atrocities committed
by the Russians, including well-documented massacres5 7 of military
REv. 854, 905-06 (1993). This disadvantage was lessened in the later "Subse-
quent Proceedings," where the German lawyers proved more experienced in
the specific litigation of war crimes than the American teams. See Jonathan A.
Bush, Soldiers Find Wars, 37 CoLuM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 675, 681 (1999)
[hereinafter Soldiers Find Wars] (noting that the American prosecutors "faced
defendants whose counsel, seasoned at the first Nuremberg trial, had more ex-
perience than the prosecution or bench").
56. See Gerry J. Simpson, Conceptualizing Violence: Present and Future
Developments in International Law: Panel 11: Adjudicating Violence: Prob-
lems Confronting International Law and Policy on War Crimes and Crimes
Against Humanity: Didactic and Dissident Histories in War Crimes Trials, 60
ALB. L. REv. 801, 806 (1997) (stating that "[t]he most successful use of [the tu
quoque argument] occurred in the case of Admiral Doenitz who argued, with
some justification, that the 'crime' of failing to pick up enemy survivors of
submarine attacks was in fact the policy of U.S. forces in the Pacific under the
command of General Nimitz"); see also DOENITZ AT NUREMBERG: A
REAPPRAISAL ix (H.K. Thompson, Jr. & Henry Strutz eds., 1976) (discussing
the perceived hypocrisy of the charge). While this argument had some reso-
nance with the Russians who had and would continue to commit atrocities
during this period, it was an argument that was primarily effective with such
military figures as Admiral Doenitz. For the vast number of inhumanities
committed by the Germans, such comparisons would not prove beneficial to
the defendants in the long run. In the Tokyo trials, this issue was also raised
and led to a stinging dissent from Indian Judge R. B. Pal who stressed the cul-
pability of the allies in judging war crimes. See 2 THE LAW OF WAR: A
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 1159-83 (Leon Friedman ed., 1972).
57. At the time of Nuremberg, the Nazi run Wehrmacht-
Untersuchungsstellefuer Verletzungen des Voelkerrechts had collected ample
evidence to show that the Russians were responsible for the massacre of over
4000 Polish political prisoners at Lemberg, Polish military officers at Katyn
and as many as 9000 Ukrainians at Winniza. See Benjamin B. Ferencz, Die
Wehrmacht-Untersuchungsstelle: Deutsche Ermittlungen ueber allierte
Voelkerrechtsverletzungen im Zweiten Weltkrieg, 75 AM. J. INT'L. L. 403, 404
(1981) [hereinafter Die Wehrmacht-Untersuchungsstelle] (book review). De-
spite this evidence, the Russians attempted to lay the blame for the massacres
on the Germans. See TAYLOR, supra note 46, at 312-13. The Russians worked
hard to avoid references to their involvement in Katyn at Nuremberg and "[t]he
fact that General Rudenko was unable to keep Katyn out of the subsequent
proceedings in the trial was one of the defence's achievements." MAsER, su-
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and political opponents." The defense struggled to integrate such
mitigating elements into their defense while contesting individual re-
sponsibility. Moreover, most of the defendants insisted that their ul-
timate defense was simply Befehl ist Befehl (an order is an order),
which was expressly and correctly eliminated as a defense to the
charges.59 Nevertheless, the quality of the defense must be measured
in light of these deprivations and restrictions.60 The defense was able
to convince many that the charges against the defendants were ques-
tionable in both law and equity.
61
The prosecution of these men was not accomplished without
significant mistakes 62 but it was an impressive effort by Jackson,
Telford Taylor,63 and their staffs. For the defense, there were
pra note 37, at 110.
58. See Die Wehrmacht-Untersuchungsstelle, supra note 57, at 403 (noting
that the use of the tu quoque defense was an effort to "dilute the moral stigma
to show that even the prosecutors did not come with completely clean hands").
59. See TAYLOR, supra note 46, at 248.
60. The quality of the defense practice must be acknowledged irrespective
of their own political history. Many of the lead defense lawyers were former
Nazi party members who supported the regime on trial at Nuremberg. See
MASER, supra note 37, at 74.
61. Among those who were convinced by such arguments was Senator
Robert A. Taft who objected that the trial had "helped to clothe vengeance in
the forms of legal procedure, with the result that the whole idea of justice in
Europe might [be] discredited." Walter W. Ruch, Taft Condemns Hanging for
Nazis as Unjust Verdict, N.Y. TIMES, Oct 6, 1946, at 1, quoted in Norman Sil-
ber & Geoffrey Miller, Toward "Neutral Principles" in the Law: Selections
From the Oral History of Herbert Wechsler, 93 COLuM. L. REv. 854, 904
n.147 (1993).
62. See Bush, supra note 19, at 2049-50. In addition to procedural unfair-
ness to the defendants in some areas, see supra notes 55-59, there were also
tactical errors such as Jackson's examination of G6ring. Not only did G6ring
appear to get the upperhand during parts of the examination, but Jackson was
embarrassed by the use of a mistranslated document. "[I]n trying to force
G6ring to concede that the so-called Reich Defense Council had been planning
the liberation of the Rhine as early as 1935, Jackson confronted the witness
with a document that merely stated that the Germans were clearing their river
for shipping without publicizing the plan-as America presumably had done
with its rivers, G6ring declared .... " Bush, supra note 19, at 2050.
63. Taylor was the chief prosecutor in twelve of the trials and had one of
the most authoritative perspectives of the trial. See Jonathan Bush, Soldiers
Find Wars: A Life of Telford Taylor, 37 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 675, 680
(1999) (discussing that Taylor's role as the lead Nuremberg prosecutor in the
Subsequent Proceedings that followed the trial of the major war criminals at
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extremely talented lawyers, like Kranzbuehler, who were hampered
by both unfair decisions as well as unfamiliarity with some of the
trial practices. Some of the finest lawyers of their time represented
both sides. Through their arguments and objections, these men
fashioned the rules of trial practice for dozens of future war crimes
trials held over the course of five decades.
B. The Significance of the Trial Through the Introduction of New
Trial Techniques, Arguments, and Practices
The second criterion is easily met by Nuremberg. With thou-
sands tried for European war crimes alone, the first Nuremberg trial
had an immediate significance as the trial template for the prosecu-
tion and defense of war crimes.64 Yet, Nuremberg's significance ob-
viously extends far beyond the crimes of World War I. While pre-
cursors existed,65 Nuremberg is rightfully regarded as the birth of
modem human rights laws and international tribunals. Rather than
simply hold the actors responsible for direct acts in the field, Nurem-
berg enforced command responsibility principles that, for the first
Nuremberg); Falk, supra note 21, at 697 (same); Benjamin B. Ferencz, Telford
Taylor: Pioneer of International Criminal Law, 37 CoLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L.
661, 662 (1992) (same).
64. Over 15,000 defendants would face trials for crimes in World War II
under this model. See Bush, supra note 19, at 2037.
65. Professor Jonathan Bush put Nuremberg in historical perspective:
There had... been a sprinkling of earlier war crimes trials. Most of
these trials, however, were unilateral affairs in which a victorious na-
tion tried captives or, infrequently, members of its own forces for ex-
cesses on the battlefield. The trial before the International Military
Tribunal ("IMT") at Nuremberg represented a major extension of this
paradigm in every regard. Nuremberg was a multinational rather than
unilateral effort; its procedure was deliberative rather than summary;
the court and the prosecution consisted not of mid-level military offi-
cers, but of leading civilian jurists; and its defendants were not socio-
pathic foot soldiers or overzealous junior officers, but the surviving
heads of the armed forces and the other leading institutions of what
had been the Nazi German state. Finally, the charges at Nuremberg
were based not only on atrocities in war, but also on the preparation
for and instigation of war itself. In the vocabulary of the medieval
"just war' theorists, the charges at Nuremberg went tojus ad bellum
as well asjus in bello.
Bush, supra note 19, at 2023.
January 2000]
670 LOYOLA OFLOSANGELESLA WREVIEW [Vol. 33:655
time, offered a potential for deterrence.66 This was accomplished
through painstaking case development by the incorporation of thou-
sands of documents and individual accounts into a cohesive trial nar-
rative. From the use of the "filmic witness" to the application of the
tu quoque principle, the Nuremberg lawyers created new methods
and models for future trials.
The Nuremberg trials also saw the development of legal cases
against doctors, judges, and other professionals for the mistreatment
of patients and citizens. Principles of informed consent and stan-
dards on medical ethics and experimentation can be traced to Nur-
emberg's trial of Nazi doctors. International principles in opposition
to the general use of the death penalty can be traced to the trial of
Nazi judges.6 7 Some of these principles continue to be cited with
reference to Nuremberg in contemporary policy debates.68
66. One of the difficulties of the trial, which led to the need for creative
methods ofproot was precisely the choice to target the high-level officials ul-
timately responsible for the atrocities. Jackson addressed this problem in his
report to the Secretary of the Army:
Few of the defendants committed atrocities with their own hands, and
in fact they were rarely visible at or within many miles of the scenes
of their worst crimes. They made plans and transmitted orders, and
the most compelling witnesses against them were the documents
which they drafted, signed, initialed, or distributed.
TELFORD TAYLOR, FINAL REPORT TO THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY ON THE
NUREMBERG WAR CRIMEs TRIALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW No. 10.
86 (G.P.O., 1949).
67. See generally 2 TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMNALs BEFORE THE
INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL, supra note 38.
68. For example, the American experimentation with radiation in the 1940s
and 1950s (and CIA experiments with LSD in the 1960s) raises analogous is-
sues. See Rae Tyson, Thawing Out Cold War Secrets: Radiation Testing
Shown in Documents, USA TODAY, Dec. 21, 1993, at 1A (discussing CIA
testing as well as the infamous Tuskegee study in which "the Public Health
Service conducted a study of syphilis by leaving black males infected and ly-
ing about having treated them"). In the last decade, some documents were dis-
closed showing the concern among some Americans that their practices in ex-
perimentation contained elements similar to those conducted by Mengele. See
Michael D'Antonio, Atomic Guinea Pigs, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Aug. 31, 1997, at
38 (noting the realization of an Army doctor in 1982, who despite his support
of human experiments, believed that "[t]hose concerned in the Atomic Energy
Commission would be subject to considerable criticism, as admittedly this
would have a little of the Buchenwald touch"). When the documents from the
1950s were made public in 1993, the United States government struggled with
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Nuremberg and its rules would be the basis for fifty years of in-
vestigations and trials, 9 including the most recent trials of Serbian
war criminals. The first General Assembly of the United Nations
would unanimously affirm the principles and charter used at Nurem-
berg, start work on the Genocide Convention, and model future trials
on Nuremberg.70 The legacy would extend to our own conduct in
Vietnam 71 and war crimes committed by individuals like Lieutenant
Calley.72 No other trial can point to such a legacy.
the very principles that it helped establish at Nuremberg:
One of the issues the Energy Department is studying is whether any of
the radiation experiments violated the 1947 Nuremberg Code, which
was established after the Nazi war crimes trials, and is regarded as the
universal standard for human experimentation. The code requires full,
informed and voluntary consent for all experiments involving human
subjects, along with demanding that test subjects be protected "against
even remote possibilities of injury, disability, or death."
Keith Schneider, 1950 Note Warns About Radiation Test, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec.
28, 1993, atA8.
69. Professor Bush correctly noted that the most lasting contribution from
the Nuremberg trials was probably the "Subsequent Proceedings" as opposed
to the higher profile first trial:
For lawyers, such principles as the accountability of private actors in
international law and the centrality of disclosure and informed consent
in human experimentation trace their roots to the Subsequent Pro-
ceedings. The modem defense of superior orders, the requirement of
an ethical dimension to law, and the narrowing of liability for waging
aggressive war to the seniormost active participants also derive from
these trials. For historians of postwar Germany, the evolution in offi-
cial attitudes toward the trials illustrates the policy of integrating west-
em Germany into the Western alliance, whatever the cost. For stu-
dents of the Holocaust, these cases, perhaps more than the first
Nuremberg trial, the Auschwitz cases in Poland and West Germany, or
even Eichmann, represent an attempt at full judicial scrutiny of Nazi
genocide. Despite various shortcomings, the Subsequent Proceed-
ings-not the unique first Nuremberg trial, the deeply flawed Tokyo
war crimes trial, or fledgling efforts in the Hague and Tanzania--are
the most sustained and successful efforts at international penal justice
to date ....
Soldiers Find Wars, supra note 55, at 681-82.
70. See Ferencz, supra note 35, at 218.
71. See NUREMBERG AND VIETNAM, supra note 21, at 96-97.
72. See MICHAEL BILTON & KEVIN SIM, FOUP HOURS AT MY LAI (Penguin
1993) (1992).
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C. Transformative or Educational Value of the Trial
The final criterion is the most important reason why Nuremberg
must be viewed as the trial of the century. Nuremberg displayed
more than the mere triumph of power, but as Jackson notes, it was a
tribute to our power of reason.73 Around the world, citizens watched
the perpetrators of massive injustice treated with the legal process
that they denied to their victims. Nuremberg showed that the goal of
the world war was to bring justice and not simply domination. It was
in the final moment that the trial distinguished World War II from all
prior wars. It was through the trial that the world turned away from
retributive justice and embraced transformative justice.74
In this sense, the Nuremberg trial was not about the defendants,
but about those with the legitimate right to accuse them.75 After
years of close struggle with these leaders, the world was able to
separate itself from them in a final adjudication of their crimes.
73. See 2 TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE
INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL, supra note 38, at 99.
74. Ultimately, too few Germans were prosecuted to be able to claim true
justice for all of the victims. Thousands of German soldiers participated in
these war crimes without facing trial and punishment. For example, the SS
Einsatzgruppen units, which followed front-line troops to collect Jews and
categorize victims, were primarily tasked with the daily duty of war crimes and
genocide. Many of these individuals were never brought to justice. Other war
criminals continued to live openly in Germany, including the commander re-
sponsible for the massacre of American prisoners at Malmedy at the Battle of
the Bulge. See Herr Mohnke - Ex-Nazi General Escapes Prosecution (ABC
television broadcast, June 6, 1994). Wilhelm Mohnke was a SS general who
was responsible for a variety of war crimes. See Ron Lowman, With a Desire
for Revenge, TORONTO STAR, Mar. 21, 1998, at M14. By the time Mohnke
had returned from a Russian prisoner of war camp, the Nuremberg trials had
ended. Dozens of German defendants connected to this massacre were prose-
cuted and convicted, but not the person ultimately responsible for the orders.
When the German government investigated Mohnke, the government found
insufficient evidence, a claim roundly condemned as absurd given the record
of the trials on the massacre and documents clearly incriminating Mohnke. See
Die Wehrmacht-Untersuchungsstelle, supra note 57, at 403-04.
75. The obvious discontinuity of having Stalinist officials judge anyone for
war crimes was galling. This hypocrisy was never higher than when Russians
attempted to use Nuremberg to shift blame to the Germans for the Katyn mas-
sacre in which thousands of Polish soldiers and leaders were executed by the
Russians. See TAYLOR, supra note 46, at 466-72; see also Masha Hamilton,
Gorbachev Documents Soviet Guilt at Katyn, L.A. TIMEs, Apr. 14, 1990, at
Al.
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Moreover, in the exercise of restraint in the use of power, the victors
gave a voice to both the victims and the values savaged by the Ger-
man government. The victims did not receive the simple satisfaction
of vengeance, but a world judgment on those who had caused such
terrible injuries. Their experiences and injuries were given voice
through the act of confrontation in the trial setting.76 It is true that
this element gave the trial an appearance of a "show trial" or political
trial. However, all great trials can be accused of such an element.
The imposition of a criminal penalty has an undeniable political ele-
ment in the judgment of a society on the accused. For instance, the
Manson trial occurred in the midst of a political environment longing
for retribution, but it was not a show trial. Nor was Nuremberg. The
defendants were not denied a defense or railroaded into conviction.77
The most powerful political element in Nuremberg was not the inter-
national lynching of hated individuals, but the reaffirmation of core
76. This was especially evident in showing films of the camps, a moment
that produced notable impacts on the defendants themselves as well as defense
counsel. See Douglas, supra note 46, at 455-56.
77. The Nazi courts offer one of the best points of comparison. In the judi-
cial system created by the defendants, thousands were arrested and prosecuted
under the Night and Fog Decree of 1941. See AMNESTY INT'L USA, supra
note 39, at 2. The primary function of this law, and the court system that en-
forced it, was to terrorize, and the concept of due process was expressly re-
jected in the decree:
The secrecy surrounding this process was intended to deter dissent and
to terrorize the victim's relatives and friends. The prosecutions failed
to fulfill the standards of due process. Defendants were arrested,
abused, and secretly transported to Germany. They were held incom-
municado and, in many instances, were denied the opportunity to in-
troduce evidence, to confront the witnesses against them, and to intro-
duce witnesses on their own behalf. The defendants were refused
counsel of their choice and, in many cases, were denied representation
completely. They typically were only informed of the charges against
them a few moments prior to trial and records of the proceedings were
not maintained.
Lippman, supra note 20, at 268. The defendants were faced with the contrast
through the use of the "filmic witness" at Nuremberg. One of the films shown
to the Court was the trial of defendants accused of the 1944 assassination at-
tempt on Hitler. Surrounded by a court affording them considerable rights of
defense, the defendants watched as their own courts and prosecutors abused
their own war-time defendants before the People's Court of Berlin. See gener-
ally Douglas, supra note 46.
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values of legal process. 7' This process led to the acquittal of a sig-
nificant number of defendants, including the Sturmabteilung (SA or
"Brownshirts"), and the General Staff of the Wehrmacht, 79 who
would certainly have met different fates in a show trial.
This is not to say that Nuremberg was perfect justice. It was
not. The legal deficiencies of Nuremberg were numerous.80 Judicial
bias was not used as a basis for removal in either Nuremberg8l or
Tokyo, 2 and some of the judges were facially unsuited to serve on
these courts. Some verdicts appeared in conflict and motivated
by politics rather than the law.83  Likewise, material information
was withheld from the defendants and defense counsel were not
given adequate time to prepare8 4 While the tribunal exercised a
78. However, this was not a view held by some leading lawyers and jurists.
See WILLIAM J. BOSCH, JUDGMENT ON NUREMBERG: AMERICAN ATTITUDES
TOWARD THE MAJOR GERMAN WAR-CRIME TRIALS 133 (1970) (quoting Chief
Justice Harlan Stone referring to Nuremberg as a "high grade lynching party").
79. See Bush, supra note 19, at 2036.
80. See generally May & Wierda, supra note 18, at 727, 733, 764 (noting
that trials were criticized for constituting "victor's justice").
81. In Nuremberg, Soviet General and War Crimes Judge I.T. Nikitchenko
rejected the notion that a judge could not have prior knowledge or must be
disinterested. See generally Jelena Pejic, Creating a Permanent International
Criminal Court: The Obstacles to Independence and Effectiveness, 29 COLUM.
HUM. RTS. L. REv. 291 (1998) (citing various examples ofjudicial bias).
82. For example, one justice in Tokyo was a survivor of the Bataan death
march. See RICHARD MNEAR, VICTOR'S JUSTICE 81-82 (1971). It has been
suggested that this background had a demonstrative effect on the rulings of
some judges in the war crimes trials:
Despite the claim of the tribunals to be applying law in an impartial
manner, the positions of the particular justices did indeed, to some
extent reflect their and their nations' losses. In the Nuremberg trial,
the Soviet judge wrote a dissenting opinion in which he objected to
the tribunal's leniency. In the Tokyo tribunal, two justices dissented:
Justice Jaranilla of the Philippines, who was a survivor of the Bataan
Death March, objected to the tribunal's leniency; and Justice Pal of
India, a country which had suffered very little at the hands of Japan,
acquitted all defendants, partly on the grounds that the tribunal was a
political rather than judicial entity, which had no right or jurisdiction
to try the defendants.
Joy Gordon, The Concept of Human Rights: This History and Meaning of its
Politicization, 23 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 689, 782 (1998).
83. See Bush, supra note 19, at 2047.
84. See, e.g., Pejic, supra note 81 (discussing the fhilure to give defendants
a critical appendix to the draft 1944 U.S. Army Plan showing approval of
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case-by-case judgment on the introduction of affidavits as evi-
dence,8 5 defendants were denied their right to confrontation through
the use of ex parte affidavits.8 6 A practice that was repeated in the
recent trial of Dusko Tadic,8 7 the use of such affidavits effectively
strips the defendant of any meaningful opportunity to contest the
credibility of the witness or the basis of his knowledge. In addition,
hearsay was allowed as evidence at trial.88 Judicial appeal was un-
available. Finally there was the fundamental objection of holding
defendants accountable to ex post facto laws.90
many of the same acts taken by the accused); see also May & Wierda, supra
note 18, at 733.
85. See TAYLOR, supra note 46, at 240-43.
86. See id. at 241; May & Wierda, supra note 18, at 749-50. Some authors,
however, have noted that, while such evidence was widely received, it was
"not heavily relied upon by the Tribunal." May & Wierda, supra note 18, at
751. This practice has also continued in modem war crimes trials, such as the
trial of Tihomir Blaskic. See Decision on the Defense Motion to Admit into
Evidence the Prior Statement of Deceased Witness Midhat Haskic, Prosecutor
v. Blaskic, Case No. IT-95-14 (Trial Chamber, Int'l Crim. Trib. Former Yugo.,
Apr. 29, 1998), cited in May & Wierda, supra note 18, at 753 n.109.
87. See Decision on the Prosecutor's Motion Requesting Protective Meas-
ures for Victims and Witnesses, Prosecutor v. Tadic, IT Doc. IT-94-I-T (Aug.
10, 1995) (allowing ex parte affidavits).
88. See May & Wierda, supra note 18, at 745-46. Despite criticism, this
practice has continued and hearsay was allowed into the Tadic trial. See Deci-
sion on the Defense Motion on Hearsay, Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1
(Trial Chamber, Int'l Crim. Trib. Former Yugo., Aug. 5, 1996); Opinion and
Judgment, Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1 (Trial Chamber, Int'l Crim.
Trib. Former Yugo., May 7, 1997), at 555 (stating that "deciding whether or
not hearsay evidence that has been objected to will be excluded, the Trial
Chamber will determine whether the proffered evidence is relevant and has
probative value... "), noted in May & Wierda, supra note 18, at 746 n.71.
89. Since there was no higher court or tribunal for appeals, the only re-
course was to the Allied Control Council, which could grant clemency under
the authority ofjoint executive authority. See Bush, supra note 19, at 2080.
90. At Nuremberg, the Tribunal held that the ex post facto rule simply had
no relevance "to a treaty, a custom, or a common law decision of an interna-
tional tribunal." III Trials of War Criminals Before the Nuremberg Military
Tribunals Under Control Council Law No. 10, 1946-1949, at 975. In the Ein-
satzgruppen trial, the U.S. tribunal rejected the ex post facto defense as based
on a flawed assumption since "the specific enactments for the trial of war
criminals which have governed the Nuremberg trials, have only provided a
machinery for the actual application of international law theretofore existing..
. [criminals] are amenable to punishment... without any prior designation of
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Nuremberg, however, must also be judged in light of the princi-
ples of the time. The Nuremberg defendants often received advan-
tages that would have been denied in most states during the 1940s.
Nuremberg defendants were guaranteed counsel at a time when the
constitutional right to such assistance was not guaranteed in the
United States. The right to counsel for federal trials, recognized un-
der the Sixth Amendment until 1938, 91 was not even applied to the
states until 1963.92 Nuremberg defendants were given a list of over
eighty attorneys from which to select their defense team, including
some of the leading German attorneys.93 Nuremberg defendants
were also guaranteed legal resources when such resources were not
guaranteed to others and were routinely denied in the United States.94
Likewise, while some rulings were unjust to the defendants, the re-
striction on the defense arguments was not out of line with rul-
ings in other cases. None of these rulings would materially alter
the outcome of the defendants' trial.95 Nevertheless, there were clear
tribunal or procedure." In re Ohlendorf, 15 I.L.R. 656 (U.S. Military Tribunal
at Nuremberg 1948); see also Eric S. Kobrick, The Ex Post Facto Prohibition
and the Exercise of Universal Jurisdiction Over International Crimes, 87
COLUM. L. REv. 1515, 1533 (1987) (discussing how "the rejection of the ex
post facto claim with respect to... crimes against peace and crimes against
humanity" can be viewed as problematic since "these crimes were not interna-
tional crimes [like war crimes] over which universal jurisdiction could be exer-
cised as a matter of customary law when committed"). Notably, however, the
United Nations moved to correct this perceived deficiency by codifying princi-
ples used in the trials. See Paul D. Marquart, Law Without Borders: The Con-
stitutionality of an International Criminal Court, 33 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L
L. 73, 76-77 (1995).
91. See Johnson v. Zerbst 304 U.S. 458 (1938). Such a right was not ac-
cepted as part of due process until 1942. See Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455
(1942).
92. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
93. See Timothy W. Murphy & Jeff E. Whitfield, Excerpts from the Nur-
emberg Trials, 6 U.S.A.F. AcAD. J. LEGAL STUD. 5, 10 (1995/1996).
94. The defendants at Nuremberg were given twenty-seven lead counsels
with over fifty legal assistants and a large administrative staff. See JOE J.
HEYDECKER & JOHANNES LEEB, THE NUREMBERG TRIAL 94 (R.A. Downie
trans., 1962).
95. The verdicts reflected overwhelming evidence of participation in war
crimes. Since the Allies began with the most responsible high-ranking offi-
cials, the high number of guilty verdicts is not particularly surprising. Ulti-
mately, death sentences were handed down for Martin Bormann (in absentia),
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violations of the rights of the defendants at Nuremberg. Jackson was
among those who acknowledged the deficiencies and stated that
"many mistakes have been made and many inadequacies must be
confessed., 96 However, Jackson noted with some justification that
"in proceedings of this novelty, errors and missteps may also be in-
structive to the future.",97 Jackson was correct. Some of the inade-
quacies have in fact been addressed in later war crimes trials.98
In judging any great trial, we must judge it in the context of its
own time. The opportunity for a legal defense and the trial protec-
tions at Nuremberg represented massive departures for much of the
world, particularly for the Russian system. It also represented a level
of protections not unlike those in the United States and England.
The question is not whether the court could have done more to assure
Hans Frank, Wilhelm Frick, Hermann G6ring, Alfred Jodl, Ernst Kaltenbrun-
ner, Wilhelm Keitel, Joachim von Ribbentrop, Alfred Rosenberg, Fritz
Sauckel, and Julius Streicher. Sentences of life imprisonment were handed
down for Walter Funk, Rudolf Hess, and Erich Raeder. Terms of incarcera-
tions were handed down for Karl Doenitz (ten years), Constantin von Neurath
(fifteen years), Baldur von Schirach (twenty years), and Albert Speer (twenty
years). See id. at 377. An acquittal was handed down for Hans Fritzsche,
Hjahnar Schacht and Franz von Papen. See id. at 374.
96. Robert H. Jackson, Report to the President by Mr. Justice Jackson,
October 7, 1946, in REPORT OF ROBERT H. JACKSON, UNITED STATES
REPRESENTATIVE TO THE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON MILITARY TRIALS
432, 440 (U.S. Dept of State 1945).
97. Id.
98. A central principle of equality was later embraced for modern war
crimes trials. These expanded rights of defendants were expressly included as
part of the Yugoslav and Rwanda trials. See Statute of the International
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Report of the Secretary-General
Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Security Council Resolution 808, Annex, art 21, at
27, U.N. Doc. S/25704/Add.1/Corr.1 (1993); Statute for the International
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, S.C. Res. 955, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., Annex,
art 20, 3453d mtg., at 11, U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (1994). These rights were a
direct result of criticism of the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials:
The post-World War II trials have been criticized on the grounds that
there was an inequality of resources between the parties, that the de-
fense was denied access to relevant material, and that the defense had
inadequate time to prepare. These concerns have been addressed by
the development of human rights law to include the concept of
"equality of arms," a concept which has been applied by the [Interna-
tional Court] such that a procedure for disclosure is in place and ade-
quate time is allowed for preparation of the defense.
May & Wierda, supra note 18, at 733.
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a fair trial. There is little question that more could have and should
have been done for the defendants. The question is whether the court
was able to break from the context of anger and revulsion over these
war crimes to focus on the process of adjudication and the rendering
of a defensible verdict. At the end of World War H, the world was in
the mood for a lynching. Like a small town responding to a grue-
some crime, the mob had the ability and the taste for "the quickest
possible justice."99 Ifjustice is best understood as an act of restraint,
Nuremberg must be ranked as the most fundamental example of jus-
tice and justifiably a symbol for future generations.
Il. CONCLUSION
In the opening argument at Nuremberg, Jackson warned the Tri-
bunal that "[t]he wrongs which we seek to condemn and punish have
been so calculated, so malignant, and so devastating, that civilization
cannot tolerate their being ignored, because it cannot survive their
being repeated."' 00 Recent war crimes, however, show that the seed
for such inhuman acts are never completely excised from our system,
but merely rest dormant like a terrible virus. Perhaps it is for this
reason that we prefer to call the Eichmanns and the Tadics' 01 "mon-
sters," to suggest that they are outside our species; mutated by a for-
eign element into a non-human with a human likeness.10 2 The Rape
of Nanking, however, was not committed by monsters, but by thou-
sands of average Japanese citizens serving in the army.10 3 Eichmann
was not a monster but a small and pathetic man. Those who wanted
99. HEYDECKER & LEEB, supra note 94, at 77 (quoting Josef Stalin at the
Tehran Conference).
100. 2 TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL
MILITARY TRIBUNAL, supra note 38, at 98-99.
101. See Opinion and Judgment, Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1,
(Trial Chamber, Int'l Crim. Trib. Former Yugo., May 7, 1997) (discussing the
International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious
Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of
the Former Yugoslavia since 1991).
102. See HANNAH ARENDT, EICHMANN IN JERUSALEM: A REPORT ON THE
BANALITY OF EvIL 276 (stating that "[t]he trouble with Eichmann was pre-
cisely that so many were like him, and that the many were neither perverted
nor sadistic, that they were, and still are, terribly and terrifyingly normal").
103. See The Tokyo War Crimes Trial (Nov. 1948), reprinted in 2 THE LAW
OF WAR: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 1060-61 (Leon Friedman ed., 1972).
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to see monsters in the dock of these trials were disappointed. Yet,
for the meaning of Nuremberg and these other trials, one must look
beyond the faces of the defendants.
Nuremberg will continue to mean different things to different
people. In my case, I will always associate Nuremberg with my col-
league and friend, Thomas Buergenthal, who personifies the promise
and meaning of that trial. At just ten years old, Tom began a terri-
fying odyssey that would take him through the Jewish ghetto at
Kielce, Poland, where virtually every inhabitant was killed at the
Treblinka camp. 10 4 Tom would survive only to be sent to Ausch-
witz-Birkenau. He would be selected for death repeatedly, only to
escape or be spared by chance. 10 5 He would work around the gas
chambers and watch other children be taken away to the crematori-
ums'10 6 In the end, Tom would be the only child to make it out of the
infamous "Gypsy Camp" alive. During the course of his confine-
ment, he would face the infamous Dr. Mengele, who would amputate
two of Tom's toes. 0 7 After surviving Kielce, Auchwitz-Birkenau,
Sachsenhausen, and the infamous "Death March," Tom found him-
self in an orphanage for two years in Ottwoch, Poland. 10 8 Assuming
that he had no surviving relatives, he was in the process of being
taken to Palestine when, miraculously, he was reunited with his
mother, Gerda, on a train station platform in Goettingen.'0 9 While his
father, Mundek, had been killed, Gerda had barely survived Ravens-
bruck and Dachau. She spent the next two years searching through-
out Germany and Poland for her son. Tom would eventually come to
the United States and study law under the tutelage of the great Louis
104. See generally Ed Vulliamy, Judaism's Witness, THE OBSERVER MAG.,
Apr. 4, 1999, at 10.
105. On one such occasion, Tom was given a card sending him to the gas
chamber with other children. As he slept however, a doctor replaced the card
with a card without the death marking for some unknown reason. Tom woke
to find himself alone in the room. The other children had all been murdered.
See id.
106. These scenes would leave lasting and painful memories. In one tragic
scene, Tom watched the Germans take a six-year-old girl for execution as she
asked, "Why must I be shot?" Id.
107. This horrific encounter occurred after two of Tom's toes appeared frost-
bitten. See id.
108. See id. at 15-16.
109. See id. at 16.
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Sohn. He would become a law professor and one of the world's
greatest experts on human rights law. Tom would serve as a member
of some of the world's most important international courts and in-
vestigations in the evolution of human rights laws and international
courts of justice." 0
While his professional accomplishments are remarkable, how-
ever, this is not why Tom Buergenthal is so extraordinary. What is
remarkable about Tom is that he harbors no hatred or prejudice after
his ordeal. The number 3930 is tattooed on Tom's wrist."' It is a
constant reminder of his loss of family and his own childhood. If
there is anyone who deserves to demand retributive justice, it is this
man. Yet, he would dedicate his life to assuring international stan-
dards of legal process and fairness. I have learned many things from
Tom Buergenthal, but perhaps the most important lesson is that the
defeat of evil requires a personal triumph over hatred. He teaches by
example, not only the potential of international law, but the potential
of individuals to transcend their conditions and history to do simple
justice. For me, Tom Buergenthal is the face of Nuremberg.
110. Tom would serve as the head of the United Nations' Truth Commission
in El Salvador and as a judge on the Inter-American Court. He was also the
founder of the Inter-American Institute of Human Rights, a member of United
Nations Human Rights Committee, the Chairman of the Human Rights Com-
mittee of UNESCO, a significant contributor to the Helsinki agreement an ad-
viser and advocate of the creation of the Holocaust Memorial Museum, and,
the Vice-Chair for the Claims Resolution Tribunal for Dormant Accounts in
Switzerland. Most recently, in January 2000, President William Clinton nomi-
nated Tom to serve as a judge on the International Court of Justice. See id.
111. See id.
